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Abstract 
This article examines the dynamics on the establishment of a health policy that U.S suddenly issued, so-
called Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (FSPTCA). Some provisions of this act having 
something to do with trade were assumed controversial policy due to two reasons. First, it banned the 
circulations of specific flavors in cigarettes but allowed menthol-containing tobacco products. Second, this act 
involved tobacco industry participation on Tobacco Products Scientific Advisory Committee (TPSAC). In short, 
this article addresses interest groups consisting of tobacco companies and civil society groups influencing U.S 
government to take action regarding ratification of World Health Organization Framework Convention on 
Tobacco Control (WHO FCTC). They both have contradicting interests and race against each other to influence 
government through varied means. I argue that this opposing domestic dynamics influences U.S government to 
issue FSPTCA that contained two controversies and adopted provisions of WHO FCTC as win-win solution. 
 
Keywords: tobacco control; interest groups; ratification; influence; win-win solution.  
 
Abstrak 
Artikel ini membahas mengenai dinamika pembentukan sebuah kebijakan atau undang-undang 
kesehatan Amerika, FSPTCA yang dikeluarkan secara mendadak. Beberapa ketentuan dari undang-undang ini 
berkaitan dengan perdagangan dan diasumsikan sebagai kebijakan yang kontroversial karena dua alasan. 
Pertama, undang-undang ini melarang peredaran rokok beraroma rasa namun mengizinkan produk tembakau 
yang mengandung mentol. Kedua, undang-undang ini melibatkan partisipasi industri tembakau dalam sebuah 
kelompok para penasehat ilmiah produk tembakau. Singkatnya, artikel ini merujuk pada kelompok kepentingan 
yaitu perusahaan-perusahaan rokok dan kelompok masyarakat sipil yang mempengaruhi pemerintah dalam 
meratifikasi konvensi kerangka kontrol tembakau dari WHO. Mereka memiliki kepentingan yang saling 
bertentangan dan saling berlomba untuk mempengaruhi pemerintah Amerika melalui berbagai macam cara. 
Akhirnya, penulis beragumen bahwa dinamika domestik yang saling bertentangan mempengaruhi pemerintah AS 
untuk mengeluarkan kebijakan FSPTCA yang memuat dua kontroversi dan mengadopsi ketentuan WHO FCTC 
dengan dua kontroversinya sebagai win-win solution.  
 
Kata Kunci: kontrol tembakau; kelompok kepentingan; ratifikasi; mempengaruhi; win-win solution. 
 
Introduction 
Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco 
Control Act 
Some decades, according to health 
experts, U.S slowly but surely had reduced the 
percentage of smokers through some tobacco 
control acts since 1960s. However, tobacco-
related diseases compared with the other 
diseases, still became the biggest and the most 
preventable cause of some diseases and 
premature deaths before 2010.
1
 45 million 
                                                          
1
 Smoking-Attributable Mortality, Years of 
Potential Life Lost, and Productivity Losses, United 
adults were still active smoker and one fifth of 
U.S students were smokers. The big number of 
smokers tried to smoke and became addicted 
before their eighteenth. Kids tried the first 
cigarette every hour.
2
 
                                                                                    
States, 2000--2004,‟ Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention, November 2008, 
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm
5745a3.htm, Accessed 10 August 2016. 
2
 „2009-2010: Inaugural Year in Review,‟ Food and 
Drug Administration Center for Tobacco Products, 
2010,  p.3, 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/TobaccoProducts/N
ewsEvents/UCM216374.pdf, Accessed 25 August 
2016. 
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After passing governmental process, 
on June 2009 U.S government through 
Obama‟s signature officially issued a 
comprehensive tobacco control act to reduce 
and protect young generation namely Family 
Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act 
(FSPTCA). This act gave Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) authority to regulate the 
manufacture, distribution, and marketing of 
tobacco products to protect public health 
strictly in detailed provisions.
3
 FDA could also 
regulate tobacco products like cigarettes, 
tobacco, roll-your-own-tobacco and smokeless 
tobacco. This acts, in fact resembled or 
adopted some provisions from World Health 
Organization, Framework Convention on 
Tobacco Control (WHO FCTC) such as price 
and tax measures to reduce the demand for 
tobacco, measures to reduce promotion to 
youth, regulation of contents, packaging, 
labeling, advertising, and protection against 
exposure to tobacco smoke.
4
 
This act seemingly has no problematic 
sides in common due to its objectives for the 
sake of the improved public health. Yet this act 
includes at least two controversies. First, this 
act based on section 907 (a)(1)(A) does not 
enable markets of specific flavors in cigarettes 
both artificial and natural flavors such some 
cigarettes containing fruits, clove, vanilla, 
coffee etc.
5
 They were officially illegal to be 
traded in U.S domestic market after 2009. U.S 
government claimed that flavored cigarettes 
                                                          
3
 „About the FSPTCA,‟ National Institute of Health, 
2010, https://prevention.nih.gov/tobacco-
regulatory-science-program/about-the-FSPTCA, 
Accessed 1 August 2016. 
4
 J.E.M. Sherrick, Food, Drugs, and Cigarettes: 
The Influence of Politics on FDA 
Regulations, University of Georgia, Atlanta, 2012, 
p.49-57. 
5
 „Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control 
and Federal Retirement Reform,‟U.S Government 
Publishing Office, 2009, 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-
111publ31/pdf/PLAW-111publ31.pdf , Accessed 9 
August 2016. 
are the gateway for the young to be regular 
smokers.
6
 
Instead, this act allows menthol containing 
cigarettes which are mostly (about 90%) 
produced both advertised as menthol and non-
menthol by big domestic tobacco companies 
notably the Big Three; Phillip Morris, 
Reynolds and Lorrilard. Ironically, many 
predominant domestic health institutions 
clarified conclusively that all tobacco products 
both menthol or non-menthol are harmful and 
different treatments are really not necessary.
7
 
This act consequently damaged Indonesian 
clove cigarette exports and caused million-
dollar loss for Indonesian clove tobacco 
companies. Indonesia then won the trade 
dispute settlement against U.S in the Dispute 
Settlement Body (DSB).  
       Second, this act allows tobacco industry 
representatives to take part and all at once to be 
members of Tobacco Products Scientific 
Advisory Committee (TPSAC) in the decision 
making about the impact of the use of menthol 
in cigarettes on the public health. Of 12 
members hired in TPSAC both as voting and 
non-voting members, industry representatives 
place 3 members as non-voting members.
8
 
Despite non-voting members, these 
representatives can potentially have important 
roles in decision making process. The rest 
members must involve and put non-voting 
member‟s considerations as important sources. 
This tobacco industry involvement remains 
controversial regarding the track record of 
                                                          
6
 „Candy and Fruit Flavored Cigarettes Now Illegal 
in United States; Step is First Under New Tobacco 
Law,‟ Food and Drug Administration, 2009, 
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressA
nnouncements/ucm183211.htm, Accessed 9 August 
2016. 
7
 „Menthol Cigarettes,‟Smokefree.gov, 
http://teen.smokefree.gov/Menthol-cigarettes.aspx, 
Accessed 10 August 2016. 
8
 „Tobacco Products Scientific Advisory 
Committee,‟ Food and Drug Administration,  
http://www.fda.gov/AdvisoryCommittees/Committ
eesMeetingMaterials/TobaccoProductsScientificAd
visoryCommittee/default.htm, Accessed 11 August 
2016. 
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most tobacco industries which ceaselessly seek 
to undermine tobacco control policies 
elsewhere. Even, this ten to one could be worse 
if tobacco industries take part in public health 
policy such tobacco control act. Tobacco 
Industry involvement is seriously not justified 
by WHO FCTC based on article 5.3.
9
 This 
article is put on much emphasized matter by 
WHO FCTC because tobacco industries are 
perceived powerful threats to the public health 
policies and tend to spoil, undermine or even 
subvert tobacco control acts in the rest of the 
world. Although U.S has yet to ratify WHO 
FCTC, tobacco involvement on tobacco 
control policy is highly questionable.  
            Given those two controversies, the 
author notes that the establishment of FSPTCA 
is not solely for health objectives, behind the 
scene political economy motives seem to take 
roles. J.E May Sherrick on her thesis “Food, 
Drugs, and Cigarettes”: The Influence of 
Politics on FDA Regulations” stated that after 
released, FSPTCA resided controversial 
stories. FDA as the main actor undertaking 
FSPTCA took no response or a step forward 
regarding the findings of TPSAC that menthol 
containing tobacco products are harmful just 
like common cigarettes. This silent action 
strongly proved that menthol issue was purely 
a political issue.
10
 In a line with this, Michael 
Siegel on “TPSAC Menthol Report Answers 
the Scientific Questions, But Doesn't Tip 
Committee's Hand, Demonstrating this is 
About Policy and Politics, Not Science” 
wondered about FSPTCA. Excluding menthol 
containing tobacco products was not rooted 
from scientific findings. Political approach 
won against scientific approach.
11
 A different 
                                                          
9
 „Guidelines for implementation of Article 5.3 of 
the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco 
Control,‟ World Health Organization, 
http://www.who.int/fctc/guidelines/article_5_3.pdf, 
Accessed 13 August 2016 . 
10
 J.E.M. Sherrick, Food, Drugs, and Cigarettes: 
The Influence of Politics on FDA 
Regulations, p.49-57. 
11
 Siegel, „TPSAC Menthol Report Answers The 
Scientific Questions, But Doesn't Tip Committee's 
view was posed by Maya Meralda Kartika on 
"Proteksionisme Amerika Serikat Pasca Krisis 
Finansial 2008” stating that FSPTCA was one 
of U.S instruments to recover a severely 
financial crisis in 2008. FSPTCA aimed at 
protecting domestic products after the crisis.
12
 
Filling the gap of the literatures, this article 
will focus on dynamics of domestic actors as 
interest groups which influences U.S 
government to issue FSPTCA.  
United States and Ratification of WHO 
FCTC 
Shortly after the draft of WHO FCTC 
were released, hundreds of countries in throngs 
followed Norway's steps to sign and ratify the 
treaty some years later. 
13
 Strangely, U.S was 
the only powerful country postponing and 
languishing the future of the treaty ratification. 
U.S had signed it in 2004 but had not given a 
ratification signal some years later. The 
absence of U.S in the global health treaty was 
regrettably perceived as an irony by many 
stakeholders putting much on public health 
attention. Previously, many health experts 
followed by developing states and Health 
NGOs (both domestic and international) had 
deplored for U.S government‟s deed. 
Framework convention Alliance (FCA) as 
representative of international actors in 
international level had pushed many states to 
ratify WHO FCTC in a line with assistance on 
                                                                                    
Hand, Demonstrating This Is About Policy And 
Politics, Not Science,‟ Tobacco Analysis, 18 March 
2011, 
http://tobaccoanalysis.blogspot.co.id/2011/03/tpsac-
menthol-report-answers-scientific.html, accessed 15 
Agust 2016. 
12
 M.Y. Kartika, „Proteksionisme Amerika Serikat 
Pasca Krisis Finansial 2008,‟ Jurnal Analisis 
Hubungan Internasional UNAIR, vol.2 no.3, 2013, 
p.10 
13
 „Updated Status of the WHO FCTC: Ratification 
and Accession by Country,‟ Framework 
Convention Alliance, 2009, p.9,  
http://www.fctc.org/publications/other-fca-
publications/doc_view/131-updated-status-of-the-
who-fctc-ratification-and-accession-by-country, 
Accessed 20 August 2016. 
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development, ratification and implementation 
of the treaty. However, for U.S, FCA imposed 
a little pressure (even almost no). It was 
seemingly due to U.S power and dominance on 
global health issues. FCA afterwards preferred 
to subordinate this task to U.S domestic health 
NGOs seeing that many U.S health NGOs are 
prominent and expected to give strong pressure 
on ratification.
14
  
The absence of U.S in global health treaty 
was highly questionable. First, U.S, powerful 
state, constituted the five biggest of smoker 
countries accounting for 45 million active 
smokers.
15
 Second, U.S inevitably had to 
recognize a fact that there exists one of the 
biggest tobacco companies in the world, Philip 
Morris. In so doing U.S constituted one of the 
biggest tobacco producers in the world.
16
 
Philip Morris has a highly broad market in 
around 180 countries and operates in tens of 
countries so it means U.S had inevitably 
contributed to global diseases due to tobacco 
product of the tobacco company. Third, U.S 
was once one of leading countries in global 
health and became global trendsetter in 
tobacco control acts. In addition to this, U.S 
along with NGOs, health foundations, 
universities and commercial entities had long 
contributed to global health initiatives and 
provided source of global insights, big global 
funds such as Bloomber Initiatives, capacity 
building, and many more.
17
 Procrastinating or 
                                                          
14
 Online interview with Chris Bostic, Deputy 
Director for Policy of FCA, 10 August 2016. 
15
 „The Global Tobacco Crisis : Tobacco- Global 
Agent of Death,‟ World Health Organization, 2008, 
p.19, 
http://www.who.int/tobacco/mpower/mpower_repor
t_tobacco_crisis_2008.pdf?ua=1, Accessed 10 
August 2016. 
16
 David, „A Review of the Global Tobacco 
Industry,‟ Topforeignstocks, 14 November 2010, 
http://topforeignstocks.com/2010/11/14/a-review-
of-the-global-tobacco-industry/, Accessed 2 
September 2016.  
17
 „The U.S. Commitment to Global Health: 
Recommendations for the Public and Private 
Sectors,‟ The National Academies, 2009, p.1-2.  
http://sites.nationalacademies.org/cs/groups/internat
even objecting to ratification of the WHO 
FCTC, U.S was obviously in contrast to its 
huge contributions to global health.  
 
Domestic Dynamic of Two Opposing 
Parties: Tobacco Companies and Civil 
Society Groups. 
Interest groups in some decades had 
significant roles in the U.S political 
constellation. Since 1964, the roles of interest 
groups had changed drastically and ceaselessly 
took a part in all aspects of the policy-making 
process as well as on the election process.
18
 
Although most interest groups are separated 
from institutions as political parties, some 
interest groups provide differing views and 
help link up between societies and 
governments and are capable of influencing the 
issued policies of the U.S government with the 
views they have and partly on behalf of the 
public interests. To influence the government, 
they employ some means such as lobbying the 
government, engaging in election activities, 
educating the public and mobilizing the 
community on certain issues.
19
 
The main point of this passage is how two 
opposing parties, tobacco companies and civil 
society groups as interest groups, influence 
U.S government regarding between agreement 
on ratification or objection to ratification 
through the varying means. The given 
condition, different natures between tobacco 
companies and civil society groups in some 
contexts bring about different ways to do 
actions. 
The Influences of Tobacco Companies 
                                                                                    
ionalsite/documents/webpage/international_053818
pdf, Accessed 2 September 2016. 
18
 L.Miller,‟Interest Groups,‟ Collin College, 
https://iws.collin.edu/lmiller/2305%20Powerpoint/1
3%20Interest%20Groups.pptx, Accessed 20 
September 2016. 
19
 „Interest Groups: Organizing To Influence,‟ 
Annenberg Learner, 
https://www.learner.org/courses/democracyinameri
ca/dia_14/dia_14_topic.html, Accessed 22 
September 2016. 
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In the U.S history, tobacco industries have 
provided big economic advantages due to 
national income, profit, taxation and a number 
of huge job forces for the country.
20
 Tobacco 
companies in particular the Big Three have 
inevitably huge contributions to national 
economy. Through excise tax, from 2000 to 
2008 tobacco companies provided 7,7 billion 
dollars per year for Federal Government.
21
 and 
10,98 billion dollars per year for State and 
Local Government.
22
 Tobacco companies did 
not only enliven around more than twenty 
thousand workers and help tobacco farmers 
survive but they also foster the other sectors 
beyond tobacco on agriculture sectors. In 
instance, these encompass around six hundred 
thousand workers from upstream business to 
downstream business.
23
 Finally, the tobacco 
companies also help U.S economy reap foreign 
exchanges via tobacco export commodity 
accounting for more than one billion per year.
24
  
In U.S tobacco product market, the Big 
Three have long dominated for almost 90% of 
U.S domestic market which Phillip Morris 
conquered around 50 % compared to Reynolds 
and Lorillard with only 29 % and 11 % 
respectively. Of all tobacco products sold in 
U.S market, a large number (almost all) is 
                                                          
20
 J.Simms, „The Political Economy of the Tobacco 
Industry,‟ Elon University, 
http://org.elon.edu/ipe/simms.pdf, Accessed 2 June 
2016.  
21
 „Tobacco Tax Revenue and Forecast in the 
United States from 2000 to 2021* (in billion U.S. 
dollars),‟ The Statistics Portal, 2016, 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/248964/revenues
-from-tobacco-tax-and-forecast-in-the-us/, 
Accessed 7 September 2016.  
22„State and Local Tobacco Tax Revenue, Selected 
Years 1977-2013,‟ Tax Policy Center, 2016, 
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/statistics/tobacco-
tax-revenue, Accessed 10 September 2016.  
23
 „Tobacco Industry,‟ Encyclopedia, November 
2006 ,http://www.encyclopedia.com/history/united-
states-and-canada/us-history/tobacco-industry, 
Accessed 12 September 2016. 
24
 „Top Export-Cigarettes 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006 
& 2007,‟ Food and Agricultural Organization, 
http://faostat.fao.org/site/342/default.aspx, 
Accessed 17 September 2016. 
menthol-containing product. Yet, only 25-30% 
is promoted and advertised as menthol 
cigarettes.
25
 While, the rest is non-menthol 
cigarettes even so in fact they also contain 
menthol with less amount.  
Aside from the substantial economic 
contributions to the U.S economy, tobacco 
companies also prepared a promising political 
contribution for the rulers. Every year tobacco 
companies notably the Big Three provide 
millions of dollars to prospective officials in 
the federal government both at the executive 
and legislative levels (Congress) almost 
entirely dominated by Republican and 
Democratic parties. The high officials 
constitute Federal candidates in short 
consisting of the President, Vice President, 
Parliament and the U.S Senates. The flowing 
funds are taken advantage of an opportunity for 
the nomination campaign indicating that the 
candidates can issue a favorable policies or at 
least more friendly for the long-term 
sustainability of tobacco companies after 
successfully elected at the Federal Office. 
 
Diagram 1. Contributions to Federal Candidates, 
Parties and Outside Groups from Tobacco Sector (US$) 
Source: Center for Responsive Politics
26
 
 
The diagram above shows political 
contributions of tobacco companies to both 
federal and political party candidates 
                                                          
25
 Smokefree.gov, „Menthol Cigarettes‟.  
26
 „Tobacco: Long-Term Contribution Trends 
(2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008),‟ Center for 
Responsive Politics, 
https://www.opensecrets.org/industries/totals.php?c
ycle=2016&ind=A02, Accessed 17 September 
2016. Note : the real amount of the money is much 
larger than in the data.   
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(Republican and Democratic) spending 
millions of dollars per year. Despite its drastic 
decline in 2004 due to McCain-Feingold Law 
strictly banning the existence of bribes or 
gratuities from individuals and companies to 
the people of the national political parties for 
campaign activities, the flow of funds kept 
flowing although the act had come into force. 
Of the contributions, the Big Three still had a 
large contribution amount compared to other 
tobacco companies or cigarette companies.
27
 
It is the same with federal office, 
tobacco companies with many intentions pour 
millions of dollars annually into members of 
the U.S incumbent Congress members mostly 
inhabited by the Senates and House of 
Representatives of the Republican and 
Democratic parties.  
                                                          
27
 „Tobacco: Top Contributors to Federal 
Candidates, Parties, and Outside Groups (2000, 
2002, 2004, 2006, 2008),‟ Center for Responsive 
Politics, 
https://www.opensecrets.org/industries/contrib.php?
ind=A02&Bkdn=DemRep&cycle=2004, Accessed 
17 September 2016. 
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Chart 1. Money to Congress (Incumbent House and Senate) From  
Tobacco (US$) 
 
Source: Center for Responsive Politics
The flowing funds (see chart 1)
28
 to the 
Congress members confirm the importance of 
money in the record of the U.S administration. 
This was once disclosed by Edward Kennedy, 
one of the U.S Senators who said "Money is 
the mother's milk of U.S politics, we have the 
best Congress money can buy and you have to 
pay to play".
29
 Funds of political aspiration 
flowing denote that Congress will often take in 
favor of the contributor‟s interests, tobacco 
companies. 
The aforementioned explanations 
brought into an idea about money politics as a 
national public secret. In the history of tobacco 
politics, tobacco companies possessed a quite 
big power to influence tobacco control 
policies. For example, in the 1990s U.S 
tobacco companies committed as many called 
“the end justifies the means” in terms of 
reducing the provision of public health policy. 
A study showed that tobacco companies put 
aggressive and comprehensive political efforts 
related to state legislation in order to sell 
                                                          
28
 „Tobacco, Money to Congress (Incumbent Only) 
2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, & 2008,‟ Center for 
Responsive Politics, 
https://www.opensecrets.org/industries/summary.ph
p?cycle=2004&ind=A02, Accessed 16 September 
2016. Note : the real amount of the money is much 
larger than in the data. 
29
 M.Simpson, „US Politics: Pressure Groups, 
Newtown and the NRA,‟ Tutor2u, 
http://www.tutor2u.net/politics/blog/revision-
update-us-politics-pressure-groups-newtown-and-
the-nra, Accessed 2 September 2016.  
tobacco with the smallest barriers. They 
intensively employed varying means through 
lobbying, mass media, public relations, illegal 
groups, industry alliances and donations to 
lawmakers. These efforts included campaigns 
to neutralize clean indoor air legislation, 
minimized tax increases, and protected the 
industry's freedom to advertise and sell tobacco 
products.
30
 As a result, many states have 
finally not enforced stricter tobacco control 
laws. This exposure concluded that tobacco 
companies could afford to become powerful 
actors in the face of state health policies and 
tobacco companies were able to use them 
secretly behind the scenes.  
In the early 2000s, the polemical issue 
was the WHO FCTC signed by the U.S 
government gave a dawn warning for domestic 
tobacco companies. U.S tobacco companies 
would be potentially threatened by the 
ratification and implementation of the WHO 
FCTC which would bring comprehensive 
tobacco control policies ranging from 
progressively cigarette tax adjustment, 
cigarette packaging and labeling, cigarette 
production and distribution, advertising and 
sponsorship rules on cigarettes to prohibition 
of selling cigarettes on minors and so forth. It 
has been a popular public secret and there have 
                                                          
30
 M.S. Givel & S.A. Glantz. „Tobacco Lobby 
Political Influence on US State Legislatures in the 
1990s,‟ British Medical Journal, vol.10, Issue 2, 
no.124, 2001. p.3. 
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been arguments from some research that 
tobacco companies anywhere were clearly in a 
position to oppose such international treaty to 
be ratified and implemented by any 
government 
31
 without an exception to U.S 
government.  
Philip Morris told in a conference that 
regardless of WHO FCTC ratification, the 
treaty would have a significant impact on 
Philip Morris as it would accelerate tobacco 
control measures in each country.
32
 This 
context clearly led by hand to negative impacts 
and came to be a threat to the sustainability of 
Philip Morris operations in various countries 
including in U.S market. In this position, 
policy makers at the executive and the 
legislative levels of U.S government would 
most likely consider the contributions of 
tobacco companies in economy and politics, 
especially the Big Three, worth millions and 
even billions of dollars highly important input 
to issue a policy that favors tobacco 
companies‟ interests. In a different view, 
tobacco contribution to national economy and 
money politics flowing would become strong 
pressure to government not to ratify and 
implement WHO FCTC.  
Domestic Civil Society Groups' Pressure on 
U.S Ratification  
In the early 2000s, one of the health issues 
taking much attention for certain interest 
groups was WHO FCTC. The treaty 
continuously grabbed huge concern from 
various types of domestic interest groups such 
as academics, philanthropic organizations 
(NGOs), research institutions, and civil 
                                                          
31
 S. Glantz, H.M. Mamudu, & R.Hammond, 
„Tobacco Industry attempts to counter the World 
Bank Report Curbing the Epidemic and Obstruct 
the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco 
Control,‟ National Center for Biotechnology 
Information, 2008, 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC26
62513/, Accessed 17 September 2016. 
32
 J.Collin, „Tobacco Politics,‟ Palgrave 
Development, vol.47, issue 2, 2004, p. 96. 
society
33
 (apart from tobacco industries and 
their alliances as interest groups).  
In the course of legal actions, the response 
to WHO FCTC became much more prominent 
when U.S government seemed to ponder 
amidst ratification or objection. Year after 
year, until 2008 U.S government still was 
silent and did not take legal actions about the 
treaty. U.S government took an opposite step 
while hundreds of countries had gradually 
ratified the treaty not until 4 years after the first 
ratification. The U.S inaction sparked 
controversy and delivered various questions.  
U.S legal actions that had not ratified the 
WHO FCTC had received various pressures 
for some years from various civil society 
groups raising concern with public health 
issues. They consistently urged U.S 
government from Bush administration to the 
beginning of Obama administration to ratify 
and implement WHO FCTC. The pressures 
were by and large carried out with various 
means of emailing, faxing, calling or visiting 
members of the House of Representatives and 
Senates who support health public to influence 
and encourage U.S government (executive 
level) to ratify WHO FCTC. Moreover, they 
were also actively writing in mass media, such 
as local and national newspapers to keep the 
issue alive and induce the people to call for 
national ratification. Last, they mobilized the 
society as well to sign an online petition for 
national ratification to U.S government.
34
  
                                                          
33
 „Interest Groups: Organizing To Influence,‟ 
Annenberg Learner, 
https://www.learner.org/courses/democracyinameri
ca/dia_14/dia_14_topic.html, Accessed 22 
September 2016. 
34
 Nichter et al, M. „The WHO Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control, An Urgent Call 
for U.S. Ratification – Alcohol, Drug, and Tobacco 
Study Group (ADTSG),‟ Medical Anthopology 
Quarterly, 2007, 
http://www.medanthro.net/policy/prior-
statements/tobacco-control/, Accessed 2 September 
2016. 
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There were a number of civil society 
groups urging ratification of WHO FCTC as 
follows:
35
 
American Cancer Society (ACS) urged 
the U.S government to ratify WHO FCTC by 
publishing an ad in the Washington Post on 12 
July 2006 asking for public advocacy in 
support of WHO FCTC. The ad persuaded and 
asked all U.S citizens to call in on President 
Bush to send WHO FCTC to the Senate for 
ratification
36
. In addition, then ASC also made 
online petition through: 
<Http://lungaction.org/campaign/RatifyFCTC>
. The petition was an electronic letter 
addressed to the President and Senate members 
voicing to ratify the global health treaty.
37
  
American Medical Association (AMA) in 
2003 & 2004 had several times sent letters to 
the Secretary of the Ministry of Health and 
Human Services as well as U.S representative 
at WHO FCTC, Thompson on AMA support 
for the FCTC by providing assistance and 
securing ratification by the U. S government. 
The AMA had also sent a letter urging 
President Bush to immediately bring the draft 
of WHO FCTC to the Senate for ratification. 
Aside from President, AMA had also sent 
letters, met and discussed actively with 
Senators about ratification.
38
 
In 2004 & 2005, Campaign for 
Tobacco-Free Kids stated clearly for its 
urging view for U.S government to follow 
                                                          
35
 The data may only encompass a few of many 
actions the NGOs and Institutions had done 
36
 „American Cancer Society Cancer Action 
Network Launches Push for 
Ratification of Landmark Global Public Health 
Treaty,‟ American Cancer Society, 12 July 2006, 
http://www.acscan.org/mediacenter/view/id/61/, 
Accessed 20 September 2016. 
37„How to get Involved,‟ Rx for Change UCSF, 
http://documentslide.com/documents/how-to-get-
involved.html, Accessed 2 September 2016.  
38
 „Follow-Up Implementation of Resolutions and 
Report Recommendations : AMA House of 
Delegates Annual Meeting - June 14-19, 2003,‟ 
American Medical Association, 2003, 
http://www.ama-
assn.org/meetings/public/interim05/i04status.doc, 
Accessed 21 September 2016.  
many countries footsteps ratifying and 
supporting implementation of WHO FCTC 
both domestically and internationally. It had 
also requested Bush to immediately submit 
WHO FCTC‟s draft to the Senate and asked 
Senate to ratify it. It stated that U.S inevitably 
had leadership responsibility in reducing 
tobacco use globally due to home of one of the 
biggest tobacco companies in the world.  If 
China, Japan, and India as some huge tobacco 
producing countries could manage to cope with 
domestic tobacco industry‟s influence, U.S 
should have done as well.
39
  
Society for Medical Anthropology 
(SMA), based on a released article in 2007, 
had many times urged U.S government to 
ratify WHO FCTC through various means. 
SMA claimed to have sent an email and fax, 
gone to President and Senators and written on 
various newspapers to keep the discourse of 
the ratification still alive to the public.
40
  
The other civil society groups pushing 
for ratification were Corporate Accountability 
International, AAFP (American Academy of 
Family Physicians), AACR (American 
Association for Cancer Research), American 
Heart Society (AHS), Faith United Against 
Tobacco, American Lung Society (ALS), 
Action on Smoking and health (ASH), 
Essential Action, American Society of Clinical 
Oncology (ASCO), etc. 
Responding to the massive pressures 
from various civil society groups, Bush 
administration in general did not take of the 
pressure very seriously. They did not hand the 
text over to Senate for ratification. When many 
asked to Bush administration, the spokesman 
easily gave a rhetorical answer that they 
                                                          
39
 „China, World‟s Largest Cigarette Market, 
Ratifies Tobacco Treaty; U.S. Still On the Sidelines 
Because of Failure to Ratify‟, Campaign for 
Tobacco-Free Kids, 29 August 2005, 
http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/press_releases/post/
id_0866, Accessed 20 September 2016.  
40
 M. Nichter et al, „The WHO Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control, An Urgent Call 
for U.S. Ratification – Alcohol, Drug, and Tobacco 
Study Group (ADTSG)‟.  
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actually supported the ratification of the WHO 
FCTC but the text was still drifting about or 
under review process in the State 
Department.
41
 Meanwhile at the beginning of 
Obama presidency, this pressure was still alive 
but Obama administration did not clearly take 
significant progress for ratification.
42
 Civil 
society groups eventually, given that Obama‟s 
commitment during his campaign for 
Presidency about his ratification of WHO 
FCTC and his track record as Senate member 
pushing for ratification of WHO FCTC, put 
high expectation for Obama administration to 
undertake the ratification. They believed 
Obama administration‟s treatment about WHO 
FCTC was much better than Bush 
Administration.  
The insistence of various civil society 
groups denoted strong public interest for U.S 
government so as to ratify and enact WHO 
FCTC. Strong pressure from various groups as 
a process of interest articulation could not be 
solely ignored by U.S government during the 
Obama administration. Such pressure would be 
an important consideration point to determine 
what policy U.S government would take on 
ratifying or issuing different alternatives of 
policy.  
 
Discussion 
Robert Putnam stated about theory of 
ratification on two-level game approach that 
leaders (heads of government representing 
countries, ministers, leaders of the House of 
Representatives and Senate conference 
committees as well as leaders of ethnic groups) 
have no independent policy preferences but 
rather how to derive endorsement from their 
constituents. Ratification takes place in 
                                                          
41
 B.A. Liang, J.P., Pierce, L. Huber & C. Bostic, 
„Call to Action: Promoting Domestic and Global 
Tobacco Control by Ratifying the Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control in the United 
States,’ Plos Medicine, vol.11, issue.5, 2014, p.1.  
42
 N. Nedzhvetskaya & J.A. Powell, „Who Do you 
Support,‟ The harvard Crimson, 2011, 
http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2011/4/11/tobac
co-use-states-you/, Accessed 20 September 2016. 
domestic level where leaders hold separate 
discussions with each constituent group and 
the results will put into effect the bargaining of 
international negotiators in international level. 
Although ratification is formally executed at 
the Senate level via voting, the important 
actors in the ratification as bureaucratic 
agencies, interest groups, social class as well as 
public opinion to some extent take roles.
43
 I 
argue that interest groups become the stressed 
point and all at once have significant roles in 
influencing U.S government decision whether 
agreement on ratification or rejection to 
ratification. Interest groups at domestic level 
need exploring rather than actors at 
international level with little or even no impact 
on the decision. This stand point deals with 
domestic dynamics between tobacco industries 
and civil society groups which are in need of 
win sets rather than considerations between 
international level and domestic level.  
The process of ratification initially 
commenced at domestic dynamics addressing 
on tobacco influence and civil society group‟s 
demands. Their interests were highly different 
even contradicting each other. First, Tobacco 
companies in particular the Big Three enjoy 
the power to influence U.S government due to, 
in short, their large contributions to national 
politics and economy. These large 
contributions inexorably embody close 
relationship between U.S government and 
domestic tobacco companies. Thus, U.S 
government under Obama administration 
needed to consider the contributions both 
economically and politically to make the best 
policy forward. In clear context, the 
contributions of tobacco companies could be 
domestic pressure for U.S government not to 
ratify WHO FCTC because the ratification 
may mostly be considered as threat to 
operations and existences of tobacco 
companies.  
                                                          
43
 R.D. Putnam, „Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: 
The Logic of Two-Level Game,‟ International 
Organization  MIT, vol. 42, Issue. 3, 1988, p.436. 
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Aside from tobacco companies, at different 
foot U.S government was also dealing with 
domestic civil society groups in the health 
sector urging for ratification. The ratification 
of WHO FCTC means U.S domestic and 
international protection of health matters all at 
once in a good line with hundreds of countries 
which have ratified it. The insistence of civil 
society groups upon U.S government was not 
significantly heeded by Bush administration 
marking close ties between government and 
tobacco industry. The administration played 
rhetoric about their support to ratification but 
the text of the agreement was claimed still 
under review in the state department. 
Nevertheless, the insistence emanating from 
massive civil society groups through various 
means certainly provided a precedent of 
important consideration for the Obama 
administration to put the best policy forward. 
During his office as Senator, Obama was one 
supporting the ratification of WHO FCTC.  
The mini illustration poses “If U.S 
government meet the insistence of civil society 
groups and some health facts by ratifying 
WHO FCTC then what about the interests of 
tobacco companies threatened by the tobacco 
control policy?” On the other hand, “If U.S 
government complies with the influence and 
interests of tobacco companies by not ratifying 
WHO FCTC, then what about the insistence of 
the civil society groups and some health 
facts?” 
Without option but facing two different 
pressures, U.S government is supposed to win 
both games for the sake of safe, rational 
achievements for two opposing parties. Thus, 
U.S government inevitably sought to meet their 
contradicting interests as win-win solution. In 
other words, U.S government issued for how to 
make decisions that can meet these pressures. 
Lately, I thought, this was muddled by U.S 
government by issuing FSPTCA in 2009. 
FSPTCA in another context is a win-win 
solution for satisfying those two opposing 
parties. FSPTCA passing at the Congress level 
then was signed by President Obama resulting 
in a tobacco control act that accommodated 
tobacco industries and civil society group‟s 
interests.  
FSPTCA issued in 2009 also constitutes 
that U.S government has made up its mind 
instead of ratifying WHO FCTC. U.S 
government was in favor of setting up an own 
tobacco control act adopting some important 
provisions of WHO FCTC. That U.S 
government had signed WHO FCTC was 
solely tentative agreement in need of domestic 
level process of endorsement.  
The tobacco control act seeks to meet 
pressures emanating from civil society groups 
but on the other hand economically considers 
the viability of domestic cigarette companies 
all at once as reflected by the two controversies 
in FSPTCA provisions. Two controversies 
consisting of the exception of menthol 
cigarette ban in U.S domestic market and the 
involvement of tobacco companies in decision-
making under FSPTCA through TPSAC are 
concessions granted by U.S government as a 
result of the implementation of FSPTCA. 
These concessions are in other words 
considered provisions that defend the interests 
of U.S tobacco companies amidst the 
implementation of FSPTCA. The reason why 
U.S excluded the ban on menthol cigarettes in 
FSPTCA because 90% of cigarettes produced 
by U.S domestic tobacco companies contain 
menthol although only 30% of cigarettes 
containing menthol are advertised and 
marketed as menthol cigarettes. If U.S 
government imposes the same treatment 
between flavored cigarettes (such as clove 
cigarettes) and menthol cigarettes in the form 
of bans circulating in the domestic market, this 
also means U.S government delivers domestic 
cigarette companies to go bankrupt severely.  
The prohibition of flavored cigarettes in 
the U.S domestic market also brings significant 
advantageous for domestic tobacco companies, 
the Big Three in particular. U.S government 
has blatantly got rid of tobacco products 
competitors from domestic market 
competition. FSPTCA, if we delve into this, 
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with two controversies strengthens the position 
of menthol cigarettes in the U.S domestic 
market instead. The involvement of tobacco 
companies in decision-making at TPSAC 
became another privileged concession from the 
U.S government.  
From the discussions above, it can be 
argued that U.S government seems to carry out 
the view “harmony of interest” in need of 
stakeholder‟s involvement not only from the 
health sectors but also from the tobacco 
industries. Another view poses that tobacco 
industry‟s involvement in TPSAC can provide 
a balance input and enable them to work with 
stakeholders from health sector. In this case, 
U.S government provides a small portion of 
the economic considerations of tobacco 
companies in tobacco control act. It is 
important that tobacco control act doubtlessly 
in small or big scale faze tobacco industry‟s 
interests. It accordingly leads U.S government 
to harmonize between the interests of health 
sector and economic interests of U.S tobacco 
industries.  
That FSPTCA is a win-win solution for 
cigarette companies and the civil society 
groups is the support emanating from those 
actors after FSPTCA had been issued in 2009. 
Although not all parties accepted all the 
provisions in FSPTCA but in general many of 
them provide implementation support. From 
civil society groups, supports come from 
Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, American 
Cancer Society Action Network, American 
Heart Association, etc. The FSPTCA was also 
claimed to grab the support of more than one 
thousand organizations of public health and 
religion. A survey showed that 70% voters 
supported FSPTCA after passing Congress.
44
 
Aside from civil society groups, the tobacco 
industries such as Philip Morris (along with 
Altria Group) as the largest tobacco company 
                                                          
44
 „FDA Regulation of Tobacco Products: A 
Common Sense Law to Protect Kids and Save 
Lives,‟ Campaign for Tobacco Free Kids, 
https://www.tobaccofreekids.org/research/factsheets
/pdf/0352.pdf, Accessed 28 September 2016. 
in the U.S on its website expressed its support 
for FSPTCA.
45
 Philip Morris became the 
strongest supporter among other tobacco 
companies. Reynolds, Lorillard and the others 
partially supported the provisions of policy 
especially regarding illicit trade provisions and 
cigarette prevention arrangements for children. 
Yet, they also filed a lawsuit about the 
provisions of FSPTCA such as modified risk 
arrangements and cigarette packaging 
regulations that shut down free speech in 
advertising.
46
 
 
Conclusion 
The establishment of FSPTCA as a 
controversial tobacco control policy was 
inseparable from the roles of domestic interest 
groups namely tobacco companies and civil 
society groups whose their interest are 
opposing each other. They employed various 
means to influence or even pressure U.S 
government to issue favorable policy for their 
interests. In short, tobacco companies with 
their economics and political contributions 
influence U.S government not to ratify WHO 
FCTC. On the contrary, civil society groups 
had urged U.S government to ratify WHO 
FCTC for the sake of public health. Under this 
circumstance, U.S government inevitably 
sought to meet their contradicting interests as 
win-win solution. Lately, U.S government 
issued FSPTCA which adopted some important 
                                                          
45
 „Altria Group and Its Tobacco Operating 
Companies Actively Supported Legislation that 
Gave the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
Authority to Regulate Tobacco Products,‟ Altria 
Group, http://www.altria.com/About-
Altria/Government-Affairs/programs-
practices/Legislative-Issues/Pages/Federal-
Regulation-of-Tobacco.aspx, Accessed 2 
September 2016. 
46
 „District Court Denies Preliminary Injunction in a 
Case Challenging the Family Smoking Prevention 
and Tobacco Control Act,‟  Food and Drug 
Administration, 
http://www.fdalawblog.net/fda_law_blog_hyman_p
helps/2009/11/district-court-denies-preliminary-
injunction-in-a-case-challenging-the-family-
smoking-prevention-and.html, Accessed 27 
September 2016.  
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provisions of WHO FCTCT and accomodated 
interests of tobacco companies and civil 
society groups as win-win solution. After 
issued, FSPTCA derived support fully from 
many civil society groups while few tobacco 
companies supported fully and some supported 
partially. 
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